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NOR AN D. LATTIN*
The Uniform Sales Act which was recommended for adoption
by the Commissioners on Uniform Laws in 1906 is in force at this
date in thirty-four states, the District of Columbia, Alaska and
Hawaii.' This Act, in both substance and form, followed for the
most part the English Sale of Goods Act of 1893. Both acts were
in large part a codification of the common law as it had developed
in this field which, in the American scene, required some choice
between common law concepts when different views found expres-
sion in different states. The English Act, like its American counter-
part, has been adopted widely in the Commonwealth and Colonies
with the result that today it constitutes the basic law which regu-
lates a substantial part of the world's trade. And while there re-
main fourteen states of the United States which have not adopted
the Uniform Act, it can be said that the common law of these states
does not differ widely from the codification which is contained in
the Act
During the existence of these statutes there has been constant
judicial interpretation of the various provisions and a great mass
of case-law has glossed the code. In 1909 when Professor Williston,
who was the draftsman of the American Act, wrote his first text on
Sales, he found it necessary to use but one volume of 1,304 pages
to elucidate the law; his second edition of this work, printed in
1924, took two volumes with 1,954 pages; and, in 1948 when he
wrote his third edition it came from the publisher with four vol-
umes of 3,281 pages and, by 1953, additional supplements to bring
the notes to date added 312 more pages.
The ideal statute would be one so clearly and simply stated
that in so far as its meahing is concerned it would need litile in-
terpretation. Its application to the particular factual pattern would,
no doubt, be the subject of litigation. But many factual patterns
can be anticipated and provided for without too great interference
with some reasonable elasticity which will permit further expansion
of the law. Precision and certainty are qualities which the busi-
ness man and his lawyer would welcome and these qualities plus
simplification and modernization have been the goals set by the
framers of the Uniform Commercial Code.2 Other objectives in-
clude the preservation of flexibility in commercial transactions and
* Professor of Law, College of Law, The Ohio State University.
I See: Orno Rsv. CoDE § § 1315.01 (8456) to 1315.76 (8455), inclusive.
2 Sec. 1-102 (2) (a). Citations are to the Uniform Commercial Code, Of-
ficial Draft, Text and Comments Edition of 1952, unless otherwise indicated.
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the encouragement of continued "expansion of commercial practices
and mechanisms through custom, usage and agreement of the
parties"; and, of course, uniformity of the law.
3
The Article on Sales is but one of eight acts included in the
Uniform Commercial Code.4 It is perhaps the most controversial
one, with serious mental hurdles which those trained in the tradi-
tional law of sales will find hard to take. Professor Williston rec-
ommends that it not be enacted into law because "fundamental
and unwise changes in existing law" have been intentionally made.
He deplores its "novel phraseology" which he claims will take
much litigation to determine its meaning, the length of time it will
take to obtain general enactment and in the meantime the serious
conflict which will exist from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and the
impairment of the uniformity which has been obtained by the wide
adoption of the English Sale of Goods Act and the Uniform Sales
Act.5 He deplores particularly the abandonment of the lump title
concept, stating that "This departure (from long-established tests
for determining title) presents the most striking and, as it seems
to me, the most objectionable and irreparable feature of the part
of the code relating to sales."6 Professor Waite emphasizes the
phraseology and position of certain provisions which will (in his
opinion) necessitate much judicial interpretation to establish the
meaning of various sections and, except to give lawyers fat fees,
will not benefit the trade.7
On the other hand, Professor Corbin who, it must be said,
aided in the project, warms enthusiastically to the draft, though
3 Sec. 1-102 (2) (b) and (c).
4 Article 1 contains general provisions and definitions applicable, with
some exceptions, to the several articles; Article 10 concerns the effective date
of statute and repealer;, Article 2 is Sales; Article 3, Commercial Paper; Ar-
ticle 4, Bank Deposits and Collections; Article 5, Documentary Letters of
Credit; Article 6, Bulk Transfers; Article 7, Warehouse Receipts, Bills of
Lading and Other Documents of Title; Article 8, Investment Securities; Ar-
ticle 9, Secured Transactions, Sales of Accounts, Contract Rights and Chat-
tel Paper.
S Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code,
63 H~Av. L. Rxv. 561, at 562, 563, 565 (1950). This article is on the 1949 draft
of the Code. Much of his criticism holds as to the final, 1952 draft, but should
be checked section by section, for the later draft had the benefit of earlier
critical articles such as Professor Williston's and a number of changes were
made in the final draft.
• Williston, supra note 5, at 571.
7 Waite, The Proposed New Uniform Sales Act, 48 Mc,. L. REV. 603 (1950).
Professor Waite feels that the changes made in the new Code are not funda-
mental enough to warrant a new draft with a different phraseology subject
to judicial misinterpretation. See particularly pp. 604-605. The changes, he
contends (as does Williston), can be made by amendments to the present Uni-
form Sales Act. Like Williston's article supra, Professor Waite's is upon the
earlier draft of the Code.
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not personally agreeing to some parts of it, and sees in the Sales
Article a product superior to the Uniform Sales Act.8 Likewise,
Professor Latty finds much merit in the Sales Article and favors
it over the Uniform Sales Act.9 There is no need to count heads for
there will be much honest difference of opinion among those who
have not as yet studied the final draft when they have had the
chance to examine it. But let no one say that the Uniform Com-
mercial Code was framed by legal mechanics working from ivory
towers. The list of names of practicing lawyers and judges, of
merchants and bankers, of practical men working at the practical
jobs they know best, who participated in this venture, attests to
the contrary. 10
The strongest argument in favor of the adoption of the Sales
Article (and the remainder of the Uniform Commercial Code for
that matter) is that this is merchants', and not lawyers' law. If
merchants favor the unusual terminology that occasionally turns
up in the draft on Sales, if merchants proceed on concepts different
from that of lump-title, if merchants distinguish between dealings
between merchants and merchants, and merchants and non-mer-
chants, if merchants consider some transactions involving agree-
ments seriously entered into as being binding without the consid-
eration which the law- i.e., lawyers' law -has insisted upon,
then a new uniform statute is justified. The lawyer and the judge
may have to learn a new language, may have to abandon some of
their lawyers' law, may even have to consult the merchant to find
out what it means as did the English courts when they applied
the law merchant to transactions not covered by statute, but the
fact remains that lawyers and judges should be the last ones to
object to it, rather than the first.
Few who have struggled through the myriad cases in which
"title" was thought to be the controlling factor decisive of risk of
loss, or of the point at which damages should be figured, or for
some other reason, will regret the abandonment of this approach
to sales problems. The certainty which the presumptions of Sec-
8 Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code - SaZes: Should it be Enacted?
59 YALE L. J. 821 (1950). This article, too, is based upon the earlier draft of
the Code.
9 Latty, Sales and Title and the Proposed Code, 16 LAw & CoqTEMP. PaoB. 3
(1951). Professor Latty wrote on the May 1950 Proposed Final Draft as modi-
fied by the September 1950 Revision of the Code. The first 343 pages of 16
LAw & CoNERlP. PRoB. contain excellent critical essays on the various Ar-
ticles contained in the Code. Similar treatment of the Code will be found in
1952 Wis. L. REv. 197-392, with an article, Sales- "From Status to Contract"?,
pp. 209-229, by Professor Howard L. Hall, containing a good deal of adverse
criticism in line with much of what Professor Williston has written. His ar-
ticle is based upon the Final Text Edition, November 1951.
I0 Uniform Commercial Code, pp. 3-6.
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tion 19 of the Uniform Sales Act seemed to guarantee was as il-
lusory as a will-o'-the-wisp. Seldom were there not some factors
which would warrant a contrary result in a particular case and
whether the case went one way or the other depended upon the
discretion of choice of a judge or group of judges who decided it.
What is surprising is that lawyers did not place in contracts
and forms devised for general use by their merchant-clients a clause
that "the parties to this agreement intend risk of loss to pass at
point A" or that "title is intended to pass at point B." By such a
method the risk of judicial interpretation out of line with the real
intent of sellers and buyers, and perhaps unreasonable on the basis
of the statutory inferences, might have been avoided.
The Uniform Commercial Code abandons the emphasis on title
and "deals with the issues between seller and buyer in terms of
step by step performance or non-performance under the contract
for sale and not in terms of whether or not 'title' to the goods has
passed."" The buyer obtains an insurable interest in the goods by
"identification" of goods to his contract and he has this insurable
interest even if nonconforming goods are so identified. "Identifica-
tion" is a new word and, while it may suggest "appropriation"
under the Uniform Sales Act, it is not equivalent to it. The term
"appropriation" is not used in the new Code, though it has slipped
into some of the official Comments on various sections. The parties
can agree that identification will take place at a certain time and
in a certain manner, but if they do not explicitly agree, then identi-
fication occurs immediately when the contract is for a sale of goods
already existing and identified; if the contract is for future goods,
then identification takes place when the goods are shipped, or
marked, "or otherwise designated by the seller as goods to which
the contract refers"; and in case of a sale of crops to be grown or
young of animals to be conceived, identification occurs when the
crops are planted or become growing crops and, in case of the
animals, when they are conceived if to be born within 12 months
after contracting, with a like term for crops " or the next normal
harvest season after contracting whichever is longer.' 2 From the
identification of goods to the contract certain legal results follow.
While the buyer has an insurable interest, the seller retains the
risk of loss until he has completed his duties as to the goods. Where
goods are to be shipped to the buyer, with no requirement to de-
liver at destination, risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods
are delivered to the carrier; and, if he is to deliver at destination,
the risk passes to the buyer when the goods arrive and are duly
tendered. "In neither case does risk of loss turn on the time of de-
l1 Comment to Sec. 2-401, at 144.12 Sec. 2-501.
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livery of documents of title."' 3 This last provision Professor Willis-
ton has criticised as being out of line with present law, 4 but since
present law is based upon the passing of title at least at the point
of the delivery of documents, and usually sooner, the shift of em-
phasis and the reasonableness of the proposed rule warrant a
change. I assume, too, that merchants have been consulted on this
point and have affirmed that it is in agreement with their under-
standing- that is, it is merchants' law rather than lawyers' law.
Where the contract calls for delivery of the goods at the seller's
place of business or at the point where the goods then rest, a
"merchant seller" keeps the risk of loss until the buyer has actually
received the goods, and this in spite of full payment by the buyer
prior thereto. By others than merchants, tender of delivery passes
the risk.15 While some may think this extreme, it is pointed out
that the merchant seller will usually carry insurance which will
protect him until actual receipt by the buyer, but that the latter
will normally be without insurance on goods in the possession of
the seller. 6 There is also the practical matter of control of the goods
by the seller while they remain in his possession. There is certainly
nothing startling in keeping the risk of loss in the merchant seller
until receipt by the buyer even if "title" has passed to him. Would
not Tariing v. Baxter 7 have been better decided had the court
taken the position that retention of possession of the stack of hay
by the seller after the sale, even for the purpose of securing the
payment of the price, kept risk of loss in him unless there had been
assumption of risk by agreement of the buyer?
While the Uniform Commercial Code specifically provides that
the rights, obligations and remedies of seller, buyer, and third
parties shall apply irrespective of where title is "except where the
provision refers to such title," Section 2-401 contains a few specific
provisions on the title matter. Where title becomes material and the
situations are not covered by other provisions in the Article, any
reservation by the seller of title to goods delivered or otherwise
identified to the contract has the effect solely of retaining a se-
curity interest.'8 In the "cash sale," where title has been held not
to pass until payment of the price, the good faith purchaser from
the vendee whose check (not accepted as "payment") has bounced
back because of insufficient funds is protected under the new Code,
13 Sec. 2-509(1) (a) and (b).
14 See Williston, supra note 5, at 582.
15 Sec. 2-509(2). But where goods are held by a bailee and are to be de-
livered without being moved, Sec. 2-503(4) applies.
16 Comment to Sec. 2-509, at 171.
17 6 B. & C. 360 (K.B. 1827).
18 Sec. 2-401 (1) (a).
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as he should have been from the start.' 9 But the most important
provision by far is that which states that "unless otherwise ex-
plicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time and place at
which the seller completes his performance with reference to the
physical delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of a security
interest and even though document of title is to be delivered at a
different time or place; ... "20 When he is to ship goods to the buyer
but without obligation to deliver at destination, title passes to the
buyer at time and place of shipment; where the seller is under
contract to ship and deliver at destination, title passes there upon
tender.21 But if the goods are not to be moved and if the seller is
under contract to deliver a document of title, the time and place
of delivery of the document of title controls, and if the goods are
identified and no documents are to be delivered, title passes at the
time and place of contracting.22 But since risk of loss is dealt with
elsewhere in the Article and since these provisions for title-passing
cover only situations in so far as they are not covered by other
provisions of the Article, it is important not to stop with the de-
termination of title as has generally been the case under the Uni-
form Sales Act.
.A novel provision in the passing of title section reads: "A re-
jection or other refusal by the buyer to receive or retain the goods,
whether or not justified, or a justified revocation of acceptance re-
vests title to the goods in the seller. Such revestment occurs by
operation of law and is not a 'sale'. '23 Under the Uniform Sales
Act where title was overemphasized many cases resulted in a left-
handed sort of specific performance, for once title was determined
to have passed to the buyer he was under obligation to pay the
purchase price and take the goods. Having deemphasized the mat-
ter of title-finding, the provision quoted above is understandable.
If title can be revested in the seller under the named circumstances,
specific performance through a title-finding concept will be dis-
placed and the usual remedy at law for the breach of a contract
for the sale of chattels not unique, that is an action for damages
caused by the breach, will be substituted therefor. By Section
2-709 (1) (b), the seller may recover the price where goods have
been identified to the contract if the seller has been unable to re-
sell them for a reasonable price after reasonable effort on his part
or where the indications are that his efforts to resell will be un-
19 Sec. 2-401 (1) (b). And see Sec. 2-511 (3) and Comment at 148. But see
Williston, supra note 5, at 570, where he states a hypothetical situation which,
from the policy angle, might well be held either way and not simply his way.
2
o Sec. 2-401 (2).
21Sec. 401(2) (a) and (b).
2 2 Sec. 2-401(3) (a) and (b).
2 3 Sec. 2-401(4).
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availing. The buyer is given a reciprocal right in case of goods
identified to the contract if he is unable to effect "cover" for such
goods, or if the indications are that he cannot effect cover, or if the
seller has shipped goods but retained a security interest and the
buyer has tendered payment therefor.24
Another bit of progress that has been made in the Sales Article
is to confine sales to things which are movable at the time of their
identification to the contract, the unborn young of animals and
growing crops, and other identified things atached to realty which
are capable of severance without material injury thereto. 25 A
present sale cannot be made of standing timber, minerals to be
taken from the earth or structures to be removed from the land
though severance is to be immediate. If the seller is to do the sever-
ing, a contract for the sale of goods results -but no sale results
until severance. If the buyer is to sever under the contract, it is a
contract for the sale of reality and the Statute of Frauds and
recording statutes will have to be complied with. A contract for
the sale of crops (and there is no distinction between those which
are fructus industriales and fructus naturales) and other identified
things attached to the realty but capable of severance without
material harm (other than timber, minerals and structures men-
tioned above) amounts to a contract for the sale of goods whether
severance is to be by the buyer or seller and, subject to third
party rights arising from the law relating to real property records,
they may work a constructive severance by identification at the
time of contracting. Such contracts may be recorded in real prop-
erty recording offices and this constitutes notice to third parties
of the buyer's contractual rights.26 The word "fixtures" does not
appear "because of the diverse definitions of this term, the test of
'severance without material harm' being substituted."27 Under the
Uniform Sales Act there may be a present sale of "emblements,
industrial growing crops, and things attached to or forming a part
of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under
the contract of sale.' 28 Thus, the buyer obtains a title to the timber
or fruit then on the trees or building to be presently severed under
the agreement but he stands the risk of losing his interest to a
purchaser of the land. It is believed that the Uniform Commercial
Code provision handles real property severance and fixture prob-
lems more satisfactorily than does the Uniform Sales Act.
24 Sec. 2-716(3). See also See. 2-502(1) where the buyer is given a lim-
ited right to specific performance in spite of competition with general cred-
itors of the seller.2S Sec. 2-105.
26Secs. 2-105 and 2-107.
27 Comment, pp. 53-54.
28Uniform Sales Act, Sec. 76 defining "Goods."
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Serious criticism has been aimed at the Statute of Frauds sec-
tion of the Code, Section 2-201. Indeed, Professor Williston has
called the section "the most iconoclastic in the Code. '29 He believes
that after 250 years of interpretation of the English Statute of
Frauds "reasonable certainty has been achieved as to the formali-
ties essential for the enforceability of a sale or a contract to sell."30
The official comment to this section indicates its breadth: "The re-
quired writing need not contain all the material terms of the con-
tract and such material terms as are stated need not be precisely
stated. All that is required is that the writing afford a basis for
believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction.
It may be written in lead pencil on a scratch pad. It need not in-
dicate which party is the buyer or which the seller. The only term
which must appear is the quantity term which need not be accur-
ately stated but recovery is limited to the amount stated. The price,
time and place of payment or delivery, the general quality of the
goods, or any particular warranties may all be omitted."31 As Pro-
fessor Williston says, "The present section widely departs both in
language and in substance from every statute that now exists or
ever has existed. ' 32 He points out that, to date, statutes of fraud
have followed pretty much the English phrasing and that the re-
quirements have been three: "(1) a memorandum signed by the
parties to be charged, or (2) acceptance and receipt of at least
part of the goods, or (3) payment of at least part of the price." 33
Anyone who has studied the decisions under the various
statutes of frauds has discovered the fallacy that the statute pre-
vents frauds. At least this new provision, made in the hope that it
will reach just results more frequently than the present Uniform
Sales Act section, requires some writing which cannot be avoided
by paying a part of the price or receiving part of the goods except
to a very much more limited degree. The writing must indicate
a contract for sale between the parties and must be signed "by
the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized
agent or broker." There may be terms incorrectly stated in the
memorandum but as far as the quantity of goods is concerned,
there can be no enforcement beyond the quantity of goods stated.
It is clear that partial performance validates the contract only to
the extent that goods have been received and accepted or payments
made and accepted. It would seem pretty obvious that, this being
so, one party cannot come in and claim (falsely or truthfully) that
2 9 Williston, supra note 5 at 573.
30 Williston, upra note 5, at 573.
31 Comment to Sec. 2-201, at 56.
3 2 Williston, supra note 5, at 573.
33 Williston, supra note 5, at 574.
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the contract was for 100,000 items (unless they have been received
or payment for them accepted) as he may under a statute which
requires no writing if there has been partial receipt and acceptance
of the goods or of the price. Under the Code draft a quantity term
must be stated and there must be a signing by the party "against
whom enforcement is sought" or the enforcement drops to the level
stated above. But under the Uniform Sales Act there is no limit as
to what perjured witnesses may testify is the contract when goods
have been received in any amount or a token payment has been
accepted. After he had written one volume on the Statute of Frauds
as part of his great work on Contracts, Professor Corbin came to
the conclusion "1. that belief in the certainty and uniformity in
the application of any presently existing statute of frauds is a mag-
nificent illusion; 2. that our existing judicial system is so much
superior to that of 1677 that fraudulent and perjured assertions
of a contract are far less likely to be successful; 3. that from the
very first, the requirement of a signed writing has been at odds
with the established habits of men, a habit of reliance upon the
spoken word in increasing millions of cases; 4. that when the courts
enforce detailed formal requirements they foster dishonest repudi-
ation without preventing fraud; 5. that in innumerable cases the
courts have invented devices by which to 'take a case out of the
statute'; 6. that the decisions do not justify some of the rules laid
down in the Restatement of Contracts to which the present writer
assented some twenty years ago."13 4 He brings out the fact that the
Code section on frauds was intentionally framed to get away from
the old statute and its interpretations. He is enthusiastically in
favor of the new statute of frauds which has been written into this
Code. We are in need of a new approach and the old statute, he
feels, should not be readopted.
There is another change in the statute of frauds section to the
effect that, as between merchants, a failure to answer a confirma-
tion within ten days after its receipt where "the party receiving
it has reason to know its contents," satisfies the requirement of a
writing. Written notice of rejection within the ten-day period will
prevent the application of the above.3 5
Contracts for goods specially manufactured for the buyer
which "are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course
of the seller's business" do not require a writing if, before repudi-
ation by the buyer, the seller has indicated that the goods are for
the buyer and "has made either a substantial beginning of their
manufacture or commitments for their procurement."3' This places
34 Corbin, supra note 8, at 829.
35 Sec. 2-201(2).
36 See. 2-201(3) (a).
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limitations upon the proof of an oral contract which do not, under
Section 4 of the Uniform Sales Act,37 exist. An admission in court
or in a pleading by the party against whom enforcement is sought
of a contract of sale also suffices to make the contract provable.
It seems to the present writer that there is less chance of fraud-
ulent contracts being proved under the Code section than under
the English statute of nearly three centuries ago and its counter-
parts.
There are other approaches in this new Article on Sales which
either clarify existing law, extend it, or cut it down. The manner
of treating merchants as a class has been mentioned and has its
justification in what merchants do. There may be some difference
of opinion as to who is a merchant under the definition, particular-
ly as to one who holds himself out as "having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction."
3 8
Awkward language now and then turns up in the most carefully
drafted acts and this particular provision ought to take some sort
of prize.39 Definitions of "lot," "commercial unit," "cancellation,"
"F.O.B. and F.A.S.," "C.I.F. and C.A.F.," "letter of credit," "sales
on approval" and "sales or return," "unconscionable" and a number
of others give direction to the act and make it easier to interpret.4 0
The price is payable in goods, money, realty or otherwise,41 thus
making better sense than Section 9 of the Uniform Sales Act 42
which specifically states that the realty-price-transaction takes the
case out of the statute, and services and barter are not within the
act.
"Firm" offers which are signed need no consideration, 43 nor
does an agreement modifying a contract.44 Open price terms are
provided for and specific results spelled out,45 and while there is
some change of the law involved, it is all to the good. Output and
requirements contracts are specifically provided for and the section
gives some indication to a court of what happens when output
or requirements increase unreasonably.46 Unconscionable contracts
are provided for, as they should be.47 "Merchantability," as used
37 OHio REV. CODE § 1315.05(8384).
3S Sec. 2-104(1).
39 See Professor Waite's criticism of this and his hypothetical case, supra
note 7, at pp. 618-619.40 1n their order of statement, see Secs. 2-105(5) and (6); 2-106(4); 2-
319; 2-320; 2-321; 2-325; 2-326; 2-327; 2-302.
41 Sec. 2-304.
42 Omro REv. CODE § 131510 (8389).
43 Sec. 2-205.
44 Sec. 2-209.
45 Sec. 2-305.
46 See. 2-306.
47 Sec. 2-302.
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in implied warranties, is defined.48 It needed definition as there was
no uniformity in holdings involving the meaning of "merchant-
ability." When warranties clash there is a section telling how the
conflict is to be decided.49 There is a section which, in a conserva-
tive manner, extends warranties " to any natural person who is a
guest in his (the buyer's) home if it is reasonable to expect that
such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who
is injured in person by breach of the warranty," and there may be
no disclaimer of this provision by the seller. ° This section should
also have extended to injury to property as the same danger exists
and it is simply a question of policy as to where to draw the line.
The power given a vendee in a cash sale to pass better "title" than
he has to a bona fide purchaser, and to a merchant who has been
entrusted with the possession of goods of the kind in which he deals
"to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course
of business" even if he was entrusted with the goods because of
representations which would have made his taking larcenous by
the criminal law, express matters of policy which make good sense
in spite of the customary practice of the common law to protect to
the last ditch the owner who has entrusted his chattels to another."'
A buyer who has paid part or all of the price and who has ac-
quired an insurable interest in the goods may, if the seller becomes
insolvent within ten days after the receipt of the first installment of
the price, recover them from the seller upon tendering any unpaid
portion of the price.52 The policy of not permitting one man's goods
to pay another man's debts is here recognized to a limited extent,
as it is in a later section permitting the seller to reclaim goods re-
ceived by the buyer on credit, within ten days after their receipt, if
the seller discovers the buyer to be insolvent and there have been
no intervening subvendees in ordinary course, or other good faith
purchasers or lien creditors. 53 And both parties have additional pro-
tection by the giving of a right of adequate assurance of perform-
ance when reasonable grounds for insecurity arise.5 4
A provision anticipating the difficulties of proof of breach gives
48 See. 2-314.
49 Sec. 2-317.
50 Sec. 2-318. Professor Williston thinks that giving a cause of action to
one not in privity is questionable policy. Supra note 5 at 579.
S See footnote 19, supra; Sec. 2-403(2) and (3); See. 2-511(3). And see Sec.
2-326(2) where protection is given the buyer's creditors, except in the ex-
ceptions stated, where goods are sold on consignment.
52 Sec. 2-502.
S3 Sec. 2-702(1) (b) "[Blut if misrepresentation of solvency has been
made to the particular seller in writing within three months before delivery
the ten day limitation does not apply."
S4 Sec. 2-609.
[Vol. 15
LAW OF SALES IN COMMERCIAL CODE
either party the right, upon reasonable notification to the other, to
inspect, test, and sample the goods including any that may be in the
possession of the other party.55
There are other provisions, some of them widely different from
what the Uniform Act provides and some making new law out of
the whole cloth, but as this reviewer sees it, with reason. I do not
view with alarm either the redrafting of parts of the Uniform Sales
Act in the attempt to simplify and clarify, nor do I feel that this
Code, if adequately studied, will require the amount of interpre-
tation that some of its critics fear. It seems to me that the things
which are good in this draft are so fine and so many as compared
with the things that are mediocre or downright bad that the Uni-
form Sales Act can well be replaced by the Uniform Commercial
Code provisions on Sales. No one who believes in the new Uniform
Commercial Code has put it better than Professor Corbin when he
wrote: "The new Code should be enacted because it builds soundly
on the existing Uniform Sales Act, because it rebuilds freely upon
the decisions and mercantile customs of the 50 years since that Act,
and because more than any previous code or restatement it pro-
vides within itself a method and principle of future growth."' 6
SS ec. 2-515.
S6 Corbin, supra note 8, at 836. It should be said that Pennsylvania has
already adopted the Code and that its provisions will become effective on Ju-
ly 1, 1954. See Penn. Stats. (Purdon's), Title 12 A, Commercial Code-Uni-
form.
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